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Abstract
A game in which an incumbent and an entrant decide the timings of entries into a new
market is investigated. The proﬁt ﬂows involve two uncertain factors: (1) the basic level of
the demand of the market observed only by the incumbent and (2) the ﬂuctuation of the
proﬁt ﬂow described by a geometric Brownian motion that is common to both ﬁrms. The
optimal timing for the incumbent, who privately knows the high demand, is earlier than that
for the low-demand incumbent. This earlier entrance, however, reveals the information of
the high demand to the entrant, so that the entrant observing the timing of the incumbent
would accelerate the its own timing of the investment that reduces the monopolistic proﬁt
of the incumbent. Therefore, the high-demand incumbent may delay the timing of the
investment in order to hide the information strategically. The equilibria of this signaling
game are characterized, and the conditions for the manipulative revelation are investigated.
The values of both ﬁrms are compared with the case of complete information.
JEL Classication Numbers: G31, D81, C73.
Keywords: Real Option, Investment Timing, Signaling, Asymmetric Information,
Game Theory.
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11 Introduction
The timings of investments of ﬁrms are aﬀected by the uncertainty of a market. In contrast to
the traditional net present value (NPV) model, the concept of real options clariﬁes the nature
of the strategic delay of the irreversible investment under uncertainty. Previous studies, for
example, Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and McDonald and Siegel (1985), assert that a ﬁrm
should wait for an investment even if the net present value is positive and the optimal timing of
the investment is delayed beyond the traditional Marshallian threshold. This concept has been
developed into the real option approach which is analogous to American call options. The real
option approach, which has been summarized by Dixit and Pindyck (1994), has been examined
in a number of studies.
On the other hand, the timings of investments are also aﬀected by market competition.
Thus, the real option approach has recently been extended to investments under competition by
combining the real option approach with the game theory. A typical model incorporating the
real option approach into game theory is sometimes referred to as an investment game, in which
two ﬁrms decide the timings of option exercises in a duopolistic market. Previous studies, such
as Smets (1991), Grenadier (1996), Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998), Huisman and Kort (1999),
and Smit and Trigeorgis (2002), investigated competition by symmetric ﬁrms. An important
implication about the previous studies about the real option under competition is that the threat
of preemption by the advantage of the ﬁrst mover and a negative externality of the investment
reduce the value for the options of the ﬁrms and accelerate the timing of the investment. Pawlina
and Kort (2006) and Kong and Kwok (2007) obtained the results for two asymmetric ﬁrms, but
the information for the two ﬁrms was assumed to be identical.
Asymmetry of information in an investment game also inﬂuences the timing of the exercise.
Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) modeled an investment game using incomplete information for
2the optimal decisions of the investments of two competitive ﬁrms, in which the investment cost
of each ﬁrm is diﬀerent and is the private information of the ﬁrms. In this setting, two ﬁrms
are assumed to be identical ex ante and the prior probabilities of the costs are followed by an
identical probability distribution. Hsu and Lambrecht (2007) consider the situation in which
one ﬁrm has complete information about the investment cost of its rival, whereas the rival ﬁrm
has incomplete information about the investment cost of the ﬁrst ﬁrm.
These studies examined investment games based on asymmetric information in which the
options exercised by one ﬁrm do not inﬂuence the beliefs of the other ﬁrm. However, in the
presence of asymmetric information, the behavior of a ﬁrm that acts earlier reveals information
to the ﬁrms that act later. Hence, the ﬁrm that acts earlier considers the strategic exercise of
the option to hide the information that conﬂicts with the optimal timing of the exercise. In
the present paper, the inﬂuence of the strategic transmission of information called signaling on
investments is examined under uncertainty and competition. In order to consider the applica-
bility of this concept, a model of an investment game with two asymmetric ﬁrms, an incumbent,
and an entrant, who have the option to enter a new product market, is speciﬁed. The proﬁt
ﬂow of each ﬁrm has two uncertainty factors. One factor is the potential size of the market,
which is referred to as the level of demand that is determined at the beginning of the game.
The level of demand is assumed to take one of two possible values, i.e., high or low. The level
of demand can be observed only by the incumbent as private information due to the experience
of the incumbent, whereas the entrant cannot obtain the information. The other factor is the
ﬂuctuation of the proﬁt ﬂow given by a stochastic process that is common to both ﬁrms. Hence,
there exist two types of incumbent. These incumbents know that the demand is high or low and
are referred to hereinafter as high-demand and low-demand incumbents, respectively. In the
framework of the present study, the incumbent invests earlier than the entrant for any market
3level because the market share of the incumbent is assumed to be suﬃciently larger than that of
the entrant and the investment cost of the incumbent is assumed to be suﬃciently smaller than
that of the entrant. If both the high- and low-demand incumbents enter the market at the opti-
mal timing truthfully, information of the level of the demand would be revealed to the entrant
by observing the timing. Then, the entrant who observes the earlier entry of the incumbent
would accelerate the timing of the investment. Since this would reduce the monopolistic proﬁt
of the high-demand incumbent, the high-demand incumbent may strategically delay the timing
of the investment to hide the information and enter the market at the timing of the low-demand
incumbent.
The present study answers three important questions. (1) What conditions cause this ma-
nipulative revelation. (2) How are the values of the ﬁrms aﬀected in the presence of asymmetric
information as compared to complete information. (3) Which factors inﬂuence the causes of
strategic information revelation.
With regard to question (1), since the low-demand incumbent does not have an incentive to
mimic the high-demand incumbent, which may accelerate the timing of the entrant, only the
high-demand incumbent has an incentive to mimic the low-demand incumbent strategically by
delaying the investment. This derives the conditions for strategic and truthful revelations in an
equilibrium. In addition, it is also shown that there exists no pure strategy equilibrium in a
certain range, in which there exists an equilibrium in which the high-demand incumbent uses a
mixed strategy. Finally, the probability of the mixed strategy for the high-demand incumbent
is identiﬁed.
With regard to question (2), under the condition in which truthful revelation occurs, neither
the entrant nor either the high-demand incumbent nor low-demand incumbent have loss or
gain as compared to the case of complete information. In contrast, under the condition for
4manipulative revelation, the high-demand incumbent increases the values so as to mimic the low-
demand incumbent as compared to the case of complete information, whereas the low-demand
incumbent decreases the values. The entrant cannot distinguish the level of the demand and
enters the market at the expected level of demand. This decreases the value of the entrant for
both levels of demand by distorting the optimal timing of the exercise of the option. Under a
mixed strategy equilibrium, it is shown that the ex ante value of the high-demand incumbent is
identical to that of complete information, whereas the values of the low-demand incumbent and
the entrant decrease.
With regard to question (3), the initial condition of the ﬂuctuation of the proﬁt ﬂow is shown
not to aﬀect whether the option of the incumbent operates strategically or truthfully. The
causes of manipulative revelation depends on the proﬁt ﬂows of both ﬁrms. In particular, the
smaller duopoly proﬁt of the high-demand incumbent causes the incumbent to act strategically.
When the duopoly proﬁt of the high-demand incumbent is suﬃciently small, the high-demand
incumbent delays market entry in order to hide the information and to enjoy the advantages of
the monopoly for a longer period of time. Thus, in this case, the high-demand incumbent enters
the market at the optimal timing of the low-demand incumbent. In contrast, when the duopoly
proﬁt is suﬃciently large, the high-demand incumbent enters the market at the optimal timing
truthfully, even if the information of the high demand is revealed.
Similarly, the smaller investment cost of the incumbent is show to result in acting strategi-
cally. Note that the proﬁt and cost of the entrant also aﬀect whether the incumbent enters the
market strategically or truthfully. The larger investment cost of the entrant is shown to cause
strategic operation by the incumbent, due to the strategic interaction between the two ﬁrms.
The above results are obtained analytically, but the eﬀect of volatility, which is important in
a dynamic model under uncertainty, could not be obtained in the present study. However, a
5numerical example reveals that the larger volatility causes the manipulative revelation.
Whereas the proposed model focuses on an investment game with two competitive ﬁrms, the
presence of asymmetric information between an owner and a manager or between an investor and
a manager also aﬀect investment decisions. Grenadier and Wang (2005) investigated conﬂicts
between managers and owners and presented a model of the investment timing by managers by
combining real options with contract theory. Shibata (2009) and Shibata and Nishihara (2010)
also examined manager-shareholder conﬂicts arising from asymmetric information in the context
of the real option approach.
Note that, recently, signaling and manipulative revelation in this context have been inves-
tigated in a few studies. Morellec and Sch¨ urhoﬀ (2011) investigated a signaling game between
an informed ﬁrm and an outside investor, in which the ﬁrm decides both the timing of invest-
ment and the debt-equity mix. In Morellec and Sch¨ urhoﬀ (2011), the presence of asymmetric
information and the signaling eﬀect erode the option value of the ﬁrm. Grenadier and Malenko
(2010) investigated a similar model that considers the conﬂicts between continuum types of an
informed agent and an outsider. Although these models are a signaling game of real options,
the present study considers a diﬀerent situation in that the model of the present study focuses
on signaling and timings between competitive ﬁrms in a duopoly market.
Information revelation involving several ﬁrms was investigated by Grenadier (1999), where
each ﬁrm has private information about the payoﬀ uncertainty and updates the belief for the
payoﬀ by observing the strategies exercised by other ﬁrms. Grenadier (1999) focused on infor-
mational cascades and projects in which ﬁrms are not in competition with each other. Thus,
the ﬁrms reveal their private information truthfully.
The remainder of the present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the nota-
tion used herein and presents a description of the model used herein. Section 3 presents the
6value of the entrant and non-strategic values of the incumbents, which implies a benchmark of
the analysis. In Section 4, a solution of the game achieved through a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium and two candidate solutions, Truthful Revelation and Manipulative Revelation, which
correspond to a separating equilibrium and a pooling equilibrium, respectively, are presented.
Conditions that specify either of the two candidate solutions to the equilibrium are also pre-
sented. Although these conditions characterize an equilibrium in pure strategies, in some cases,
there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. Section 5 deals with mixed strategies and presents
the conditions of the equilibria. Since these equilibria in mixed strategies include the case of
equilibria in pure strategies examined in the previous section, the conditions characterize the
equilibrium comprehensively. In Section 6, the manner in which the values of ﬁrms are aﬀected
by the presence of asymmetric information is examines. The gains and losses of the values for
both high-demand and low-demand incumbents and the entrant are compared with the case
of full information. The conditions of the manipulative revelation for the duopoly proﬁt and
the costs of the incumbent and the entrant are also examined. Section 7 presents numerical
examples, and Section 8 presents conclusions and discusses future research.
2 The Model
Two asymmetric ﬁrms, an incumbent and an entrant, each of which has the option to wait for
optimal entry into the market of a new product are considered. The incumbent and the entrant
are denoted as ﬁrm I and ﬁrm E, respectively. The investments for the entry of both ﬁrms
are assumed to be irreversible, and the sunk cost of the investment of ﬁrm i is denoted as Ki
for i = I,E. The revenue ﬂow of each ﬁrm after the entry depends on the market structure
(monopoly or duopoly) and two uncertain factors of the proﬁt.
One uncertain factor of the proﬁt represents a stochastic process, denoted by Xs, as a
7standard real option setting. Here, Xs is interpreted as the unsystematic shocks of the demand
over time and is common to both ﬁrms.
Suppose that Xs follows a geometric Brownian motion:
dXs = µXsdt + σXsdz
where µ is the drift parameter, σ is the volatility parameter, and dz is the increment of a
standard Winner process. Both ﬁrms are assumed to be risk neutral, with risk free rate of
interest r. Finally, r > µ is assumed for convergence.
The other uncertain factor of the proﬁt represents a systematic risk and is assumed to be
constant over time. This factor is denoted by θ, where θ = H and θ = L indicate that the basic
level of demand is high and low, respectively. The prior probabilities of drawing θ = H and
θ = L are denoted as p and 1 − p, respectively.
When only ﬁrm i enters the market, the monopoly proﬁt ﬂow of ﬁrm i becomes π
i1Xs. On
the other hand, when both ﬁrms enter the market, the duopoly proﬁt ﬂow of ﬁrm i becomes
π
i2Xs. The proﬁt ﬂow of any ﬁrm that has not entered the market is assumed to be zero. Here,
π
i1 > π
i2 > 0 is assumed for the case in which i = I,E and θ = H,L. The monopoly proﬁt is
always greater than the duopoly proﬁt for each ﬁrm and each level of demand at the same Xs.
Moreover, πH
ij > πL
ij > 0 is assumed for i = I,E and θ = H,L, which indicate that the proﬁt at
a high level of demand is always greater than that at a low level of demand.
The incumbent has several advantages over the entrant due to the experience the incumbent
gains through past activities. The incumbent has more information, a greater share of the
products, and a lower investment cost than the entrant. In detail, the incumbent has the
following two advantages. First, while Xs is observable by two ﬁrms, the uncertain factor θ can
be observed only by the incumbent, i.e., θ is the private information of the incumbent. Second,
KI/πL
I2 is assumed to be smaller than KE/πH
E1. This assumption holds if the monopoly proﬁt
8of the incumbent is suﬃciently larger than that of the entrant and/or the cost of the investment
KI is suﬃciently smaller than KE.
3 Value Functions of a Benchmark Case
The proposed model is one of an option exercise game that is investigated under the joint
framework of real options and game theory. A number of studies, including Smets (1991),
Grenadier (1996), Kijima and Shibata (2002), Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998), Huisman and Kort
(1999), Huisman (2001), and Smit and Trigeorgis (2002), have considered symmetric ﬁrms in
order to examine the preemptive behavior of competition. In these models, if the value of the
optimal entry of the leader is greater than the value of the entry for the best reply of the follower,
then both ﬁrms want to become a leader. In this case, the optimal threshold of the leader is
obtained solving a system of equations of equilibria, and the value of the leader is not determined
by maximizing the expected proﬁt of either ﬁrm. Huisman (2001), Kong and Kwok (2007) and
Pawlina and Kort (2006) demonstrated that this preemptive behavior and simultaneous entry
would occur under asymmetry of costs and proﬁts. In this case, obtaining the equilibrium values
is complicated.
However, if the asymmetry is suﬃciently large and the initial value of both ﬁrms are suﬃ-
ciently small to wait for the investment, the lower-cost ﬁrm must be the leader, (see Kong and
Kwok (2007) and Pawlina and Kort (2006)). Based on the results of Kong and Kwok (2007),
the two assumptions, i.e., KI/πL
I2 > KE/πH
E1 and suﬃciently small Xt = x, imply that the
incumbent must be the leader and that the entrant must be the follower.
Due to this setting, the decisions and the values of both ﬁrms are analyzed under the condi-
tion in which the incumbent is the leader and the entrant is the follower. In following subsections,
the benchmark case is solved by backward induction, i.e., the value of the entrant is solved ﬁrst
9and the value of the incumbent as the leader is discussed later.
3.1 Value of the Entrant
In the settings of the present study, the entrant must be the follower, and the entrant is shown
later herein to exercise the option at the optimal timing based on the belief of the level of the
demand. Thus, it is necessary to consider only the optimal expected payoﬀ of the entrant, which
is derived from a standard real option approach. Let u
E(q) be the value of the entrant under the
condition in which the entrant invests later than the incumbent and believes that high demand
will occur with probability q.
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In this problem, a threshold strategy is suﬃcient to give the optimal stopping time. Hence
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where τ(˜ x) denote the ﬁrst hitting time at threshold ˜ x, i.e., τ(˜ x) = inf{s ≥ t|Xs ≥ ˜ x}. Let
x
E(q) be the optimal threshold for the belief q. The usual calculation of real option analysis
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E are the thresholds
when the entrant believes that the demands are high and low, respectively. In addition, xM
E is
the threshold when the entrant predicts high demand with prior probability p.








3.2 Value of the Incumbent
In contrast to the entrant, the incumbent is the leader and may not enter the market at the
optimal timing due to the strategic revelation of the information. Since the incumbent taking
into account the strategic exercise chooses the timing of the investment that may not be optimal,
the value of the incumbent explicitly expressed by a function of the threshold of the investment
by the incumbent. The value of the incumbent also depends on the timing of the entrant and
the private information of the level of the demand observed by the incumbent. Let uI(xI,xE,θ)
be the expected proﬁt of the incumbent with the level of the demand θ, when the incumbent
invests at the threshold xI and the entrant invests at xE under the condition xI < xE.










uI(xI,xE,θ) can be rewritten as














In the following, in order to simplify the analysis, the initial condition x is assumed to be
suﬃciently small, indicating that the incumbent for any demand has not yet invested at the
11initial time. Hence, only the case in which x ≤ xI is examined. Since xI < xE, x is also
less than xE. Under these assumptions, vI(xI,θ) and wI(xE,θ) are expressed as the following
proposition, which can be derived by the strong Markov property of the geometric Brownian
motion and the calculation for the hitting time.
Proposition 3.1. uI(xI,xE,θ) is given by






















, x < xE. (6)
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that (3) yields
wI(xH
E,θ) ≥ wI(xM
E ,θ) ≥ wI(xL
E,θ) (7)
because wI(xE,θ) is the decrease in the threshold xE.
If xE is independent of the incumbent decision xI, then wI(xE,θ) does not depend on xI.
Then, the incumbent can maximize the expected proﬁt only by vI(xI,θ).
The threshold xE of the entrant in the signaling equilibrium, which is examined in the next
section, depends on the threshold of the incumbent xI. In the remainder of this section, however,
the case in which xE is independent of xI is examined as a benchmark of the analysis. Let x
I
be the optimal threshold of the incumbent with the private information θ under the condition
that xE is independent of xI. Then, vI(x





































r x − KI x > x
I.
4 Equilibrium in Pure Strategies
4.1 Denitions of the Solution
For the analysis of the signaling eﬀect, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is applied as the solution
concept. In this model, a solution concept is speciﬁed not only by a threshold for each of the
players, but also by the entrant belief regarding the level of demand.
An assessment consisting of three components {(aI(H),aI(L)),aE(·),q(·)} is called, where:
• aI(H) and aI(L) are the threshold of the incumbent for private information H and L,
respectively,
• aE(xI) is the threshold of the entrant for the threshold xI of the observed incumbent, and




E(·),q(·)} is said to be an equilibrium if the assessment
satisﬁes the following three conditions.
First, a












I();) are calculated based on the smooth pasting condition and the value matching
condition of real option approach. These conditions can also be derived from the ﬁrst-order condition to maximize
vI(xI;), which is obtained by diﬀerentiating (5).
13Second, a
E(·) is the threshold of the entrant observing the entry of the incumbent at xI with




Finally, q(xI) is the belief of the entrant for the high demand, when the entrant has observed
the thresholds of the incumbent xI, which should be consistent with the equilibrium strategy
of the incumbent (aI(H),aI(L)) in the sense of Bayes rule. The consistent belief q(xI) is
calculated as follows. Then q(xI) = Prob[θ = H|xI]. According to Bayes ʟrule,
Prob[θ = H|xI] =
Prob[xI|θ = H]Prob[θ = H]
Prob[θ = H]Prob[xI|θ = H] + Prob[θ = L]Prob[xI|θ = L]
.
Substituting Prob[θ = H] = p and Prob[θ = L] = 1 − p, the consistent belief is expressed by
q(xI) =
pProb[xI|θ = H]
pProb[xI|θ = H] + (1 − p)Prob[xI|θ = L]
. (11)
In Section 5, the mixed strategies of the incumbent are investigated, so that Prob[xI|θ = H]
and Prob[xI|θ = L] would follow some probability distributions derived from a mixed strategy
of the incumbent. However, in this section, since the analysis is restricted to pure strategies,
Prob[xI|θ = H] and Prob[xI|θ = L] can be explicitly written as




1 xI = a
I(H)
0 xI ̸= a
I(H),




1 xI = a
I(L)
0 xI ̸= a
I(L).
(12)
Equations (11) and (12) imply that
q(xI) =

      
      
p xI = a
I(H) and xI = a
I(L),
1 xI = a
I(H) and xI ̸= a
I(L),
0 xI ̸= a




I(H) ̸= xI and a
I(L) ̸= xI, then any belief q(xI) is consistent.
Thus, in pure strategies, an perfect Bayesian equilibrium is formally deﬁned as follows.
14Denition 4.1. An assessment is said to be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies if
the assessment satises (9), (10), and (13).
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies is said to be a pooling equilibrium if a
I(H) =
a




A pooling equilibrium corresponds to the case in which the actions of the incumbent do not
convey information about the demand, and the entrant predicts high demand with prior prob-











A perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies is said to be a separating equilibrium if
a
I(H) ̸= a
I(L). In the separating equilibrium, Eq. (13) implies that
q(a
I(H)) = 1, q(a
I(L)) = 0.
This means that the entrant determines the level of the demand exactly by observing the actions








4.2 Two Assessments: Truthful Revelation and Manipulative Revelation
In this section, the following two assessments , Truthful Revelation and Manipulative Revelation,
are deﬁned. In next section, it is found that either of them can be an equilibrium exclusively.












E xI ̸= xL
I ,
xL






1 xI ̸= xL
I ,
0 xI = xL
I .
If Truthful Revelation is an equilibrium, it is a separating equilibrium. In Truthful Revelation,
the incumbent for any demand truthfully enters the market at the optimal threshold with respect
to the demand. This truthful behavior reveals the information of the demand that the incumbent
possesses. The entrant obtains the information about the demand by observing the behavior of
the incumbent and enters the market optimally with full information. If the entrant observes
that the incumbent enters the market at neither xH
I nor xL
I , then any belief of the entrant is
consistent. In other words, the belief of the entrant is assigned arbitrarily in the observation of
the entrant in this oﬀ-equilibrium path. For this unexpected deviation of the equilibrium for
the incumbent, the entrant is assumed to believe that the demand is high.











E xI ̸= xL
I ,
xM






1 xI ̸= xL
I ,
p xI = xL
I
If Manipulative Revelation is an equilibrium, it is a pooling equilibrium. In Manipulative Reve-
lation, the high-demand incumbent does not enters at the optimal threshold of the high demand
but rather invests at the threshold of the low demand. This delay of the investment hides the
16information about the high demand, and the entrant cannot distinguish the demand by observ-
ing the behavior of the incumbent. Thus, the entrant predicts the level of the demand according
to the prior probability and enters at the threshold for the expectation of the demand. The
entrant is assumed to believe that high demand occurs in the oﬀ-equilibrium path, as well as
Truthful Revelation.
4.3 Conditions for Equilibrium in Strategies
In this subsection, the conditions in which either of the candidates, Truthful Revelation or
Manipulative Revelation, is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies is analyzed. Since
both candidates are constructed by satisfying the optimality of the entrant and the consistency
of the belief of the entrant, it remains to consider the optimality of the incumbent for the
strategy a
E(·) and belief q(·) of a given entrant. Moreover, the low-demand incumbent does
not have an incentive to deviate from the optimal timing xL
I because pretending the high-demand
incumbent only accelerates the timing of the investment of the entrant and reduces the value of
the incumbent. Hence, only the timing of the high-demand incumbent should be considered.
Consider the necessary conditions for both candidates being equilibria. First, assume that
Truthful Revelation is an equilibrium in pure strategies. In Truthful Revelation, the entrant
observing the investment of the incumbent at x
I for any θ = H,L invests at x
E. Since the
high-demand incumbent does not have an incentive to hide information in order to delay the






Next, suppose that Manipulative Revelation is an equilibrium in pure strategies. In Manip-
ulative Revelation, the incumbent with information of the high demand strategically delays the
investment until the optimal timing for the low demand, and the entrant cannot obtain infor-
17mation about the demand. The entrant observing the investment of the incumbent at xL then
predicts the level of the demand by prior probability p, so that the expectation of the proﬁt ﬂow
is πM
E2. The entrant then enters the market at xM
E , which is optimal for πM
E2. The incumbent
with information of the high demand has an incentive to hide information if the expected value
for this delayed entrance at xL
I exceeds that of the optimal entrance at the threshold of the high
demand xH






Equations (14) and (15) are not only necessary conditions. The following proposition asserts
that Eqs. (14) and (15) are also suﬃcient conditions of the equilibrium.
Proposition 4.2. (a) Equation (14) holds if and only if Truthful Revelation is a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in pure strategies.
(b) Equation (15) holds if and only if Manipulative Revelation is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
in pure strategies.
Proof. First, it is shown that if assessment {(a
I(H),a
I(L)),a
E(·),q(·)} is Truthful Revelation,
then it is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies. In order to prove this relationship, it
is suﬃcient to show that the assessment satisﬁes three conditions, namely, the optimality of the
incumbent given by Eq. (9), the optimality of the entrant given by Eq. (10), and the consistency
of the belief of the entrant given by Eq. (13). By deﬁnition, Truthful Revelation always satisﬁes
the optimality of the entrant given by Eq. (10) and the consistency of the belief given by Eq.
(13). However, Truthful Revelation must be formally demonstrated to satisfy the optimality of






18and for any xI ̸= a
I(θ).








any xI ̸= xL
I , we need only show that uI(xL
I ,xL
E,L) ≥ uI(xI,xH
E,L) for any xI ̸= xL
I . Since xL
I
is the optimal threshold of the incumbent, vI(xL




I ,L) − w(xL
E,L) ≥ vI(xI,L) − wI(xH
E,L) = uI(xI,xH
E,L)
because Eq. (7) yields wI(xH
E,L) ≥ wI(xL
E,L). Hence, Eq. (16) holds for θ = L.
Second, let θ = H. Then, we have to prove uI(xH
I ,xH
E,H) ≥ uI(xI,xH







I is the optimal threshold of the incumbent,
vI(xH




I ,H) − w(xH







E,H) holds because of Eq. (14). Then, Truthful Revelation is a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies.
Conversely, it is herein proven that if Truthful Revelation is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium









in Truthful Revelation, which means that Truthful Revelation is not an equilibrium. This
completes the proof of (a).
The proof of (b) is obtained in a similar manner.
Since uI(xL
I ,xM
E ,H) ≤ uI(xL
I ,xL
E,H), it is found that neither Truthful Revelation nor Ma-







E ,H). In this interval, the mixed strategy of the incumbent should
be considered in order to ensure the existence of the equilibrium. In Section 5, the equilibria in
the mixed strategies are investigated.
195 Equilibria in Mixed Strategies
In order to examine mixed strategies of the incumbent, the notation is extended for actions and
a payoﬀ function of the incumbent. Let xI(λ) be a mixed action of the incumbent, where the
incumbent chooses xH
I with probability λ and xL
I with probability 1 − λ for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Even if
the incumbent uses the mixed action, the entrant observes only a realized action, either xH
I or
xL
I , in the equilibrium and takes an action, either aE(xH
I ) or aE(xL
I ). Here, uI is extended to
the set of mixed actions xI(λ) for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, as deﬁned by
uI(xI(λ),aE(·),θ) = λuI(xH
I ,aE(xH
I ),θ) + (1 − λ)uI(xL
I ,aE(xL
I ),θ)
for any xE and θ = H,L. Here, uI(xI(λ),aE(·),θ) denotes the expected payoﬀ of the incumbent,
where the incumbent uses mixed action xI(λ), and the entrant follows aE(·).
The incumbent strategy a
I(H) = xI(λ) and a
I(L) = xL
I is considered because the low-
demand incumbent in the equilibrium does not have an incentive to deviate from the optimal
timing, which is analogous to the discussion of pure strategies. The consistent belief of the
entrant q(·) for a
I(H) = xI(λ) and a
I(L) = xL
I is derived by Bayes rule, given by Eq. (11).
Here, Prob[xI|θ = H] and Prob[xI|θ = L] are given by
Prob[xI|θ = H] =

      
      
λ xI = xH
I
1 − λ xI = xL
I
0 xI ̸= xH
I ,xL
I ,




1 xI = xL
I
0 xI ̸= xL
I ,
(17)















20The consistent belief q(·) indicates that the entrant observing the investment at xH
I completely
learns the high demand with probability one, because only the incumbent with information
of the high demand invests at xH
I . Hence, the optimal timing of investment of the entrant
observing the investment of the incumbent at xH
I is xH
E. On the other hand, since both types
of the incumbents have positive probabilities of the investment at xL
I , the entrant observing
that the incumbent acted at xL
I predicts the high demand according to probability q(xL
I ). The




I )). For simplicity, let x
E(q(xL
I )) be x
E.
The following assessment {(a
I(H),a
I(L)),a
E(·),q(·)}, referred to as λ-Hybrid Revelation,
is a candidate solution, which satisﬁes the optimality of the entrant and the consistence of the
belief.
a









E xI ̸= xL
I ,
x






1 xI ̸= xL
I ,
p(1 )
1 p xI = xL
I ,
Note that λ-Hybrid Revelations for λ = 1 and λ = 0 are identical to Truthful Revelation
and Manipulative Revelation, respectively. Hence, the condition in which λ-Hybrid Revelation
is an equilibrium characterizes any equilibrium comprehensively.
Next, the probability λ in the equilibrium strategies for uI(xL
I ,xM





E,H) is solved. Let {(a
I(H),a
I(L)),a
E(·),q(·)} be λ-Hybrid Revelation. The high-
demand incumbent does not have an incentive to deviate from mixed strategy xI(λ) to any
























so that the incumbent has an incentive to deviate from mixed strategy xI(λ) to pure strategy xH
I .




E,H). Similarly, in this case, the incumbent
has an incentive to deviate from mixed strategy xI(λ) to pure strategy xL
I . Hence, the mixed





solving this equation yields λ in the equilibrium. The results can be summarized as the following
proposition.
Proposition 5.1. The following three cases occur depending on the conditions in which
uI(xH
I ,xH









E,H) if and only if λ-Hybrid Revelation for λ = 1, which
is identical to Truthful Revelation, is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium,
Case (b) uI(xL
I ,xM




E,H) if and only if λ-Hybrid Revelation










E ,H) if and only if λ-Hybrid Revelation for λ = 0, which
is identical to Manipulative Revelation, is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
226 Values of the Incumbents and Comparative Statics
6.1 Values in an Equilibrium
In this subsection, the distortion of the values of ﬁrms by the presence of asymmetric information
is examined. The gains and losses of the values for both types of incumbent and entrant are
compared with the case of full information.
In Case (a), Truthful Revelation is an equilibrium. The value of the incumbent for each
demand level θ = H,L is given by uI(x
I,x
E,θ). The values of the entrant for demand levels
θ = H and θ = L are given by u
E(1) and u
E(0), respectively. The entrant for any demand
level is completely informed by signaling in this case, so that none of the ﬁrms have gain or loss
compared with the case of full information.
In Case (b), λ-Hybrid Revelation is an equilibrium. For the high demand θ = H, the
value of the incumbent is uI(xI(λ),a






E(·),H) is equal to uI(xH
I ,xH















Hence, the ex ante expected value of the high-demand incumbent is uI(xH
I ,xH
E,H), and no loss





E,L) compared with the case of full information, because the entrant
observing that the incumbent enters the market at xL
I invests at x
E, which is earlier than xL
E.
Since, the entrant also losses the value by distorting the optimal timing of the exercise of the
option for both levels of demand. Consequently, the values of all ﬁrms in Case (b) are less than
or equal to the values in the case of full information.
23Note that the high-demand incumbent has no loss for either the ex ante value or the ex post
value, as compared to the case of complete information. The mixed strategy realizes trigger xH
I
with probability λ and trigger xL
I with probability 1 −λ. Given the realization of the timing at
xH
I , the entrant enters the market at xH
E, so that the ex post value of the high-demand incumbent
is uI(xH
I ,xH
E,H), which is identical to the value in complete information. If the realization of the
timing is xL
I , then the entrant enters the market at x







E,H), the value is also same as that
in complete information.
Finally, we consider Case (c), in which Manipulative Revelation is an equilibrium. The values
of the high- and low-demand incumbents are given by uI(xL
I ,xM





E ,H) ≥ uI(xH
I ,xH
E,H) holds in Case (c), the high-demand incumbent




E,H), as compared to full information by
mimicking the low-demand incumbent and letting the entrant delay investment. In contrast,




E ,L), as compared with the case
of full information, because the entrant cannot obtain the information of demand and puts the
entrance ahead xM
E from xL
E. Thus, similarly to Case (b), the entrant losses the value by dis-
torting the optimal timing for both demand levels. Only the high-demand incumbent gains by
manipulative revelation, where the low-demand incumbent and the entrant are harmed by the
strategic behavior of the high-demand incumbent.
6.2 Comparative Statics
In this subsection, the inﬂuences of various factors on strategic information revelation are ex-
amined. First, the manipulative revelation is shown to depend on the duopoly proﬁt ﬂow of the
high-demand incumbent by solving Eqs. (14) and (15) for duopoly proﬁt ﬂow of the high-demand
24incumbent πH
I2.















Proposition 5.1 implies the conditions of manipulative revelation for πH
I2.















































Proposition 6.1 states that larger duopoly proﬁt ﬂow at high demand ensures that the high-
demand incumbent truthfully enters the market at the optimal timing because the high-demand
incumbent has less incentive to prevent earlier investment of the entrant. In contrast, less
duopoly proﬁt ﬂow at the high demand makes the high-demand incumbent to hide information
and take advantage of the monopoly for a longer time. Hence, in this case, strategically, the
high-demand incumbent enters the market at the optimal timing of the low-demand incumbent
25in order to hide the information. In the mid-range of the duopoly proﬁt ﬂow, the high-demand
incumbent uses a mixed strategy.
Proposition 6.2 is obtained by solving the equations in 6.1 to the ratio between the incumbent
and the entrant of costs.





















































Proposition 6.2 asserts that a suﬃciently lower cost of the incumbent or a suﬃciently larger
cost of the entrant causes the high-demand incumbent enter the market at the optimal timing
truthfully. In contrast, under a larger cost of the incumbent or a lower cost of the entrant, the
high-demand incumbent has the incentive of the strategic entrance.
7 Numerical Examples for Equilibrium Strategies and Values
In this section, results of comparative statics for equilibrium strategies and the values of the
incumbent are presented through numerical examples. Parameters in examples are basically set
as µ = 0.03, r = 0.07, p = 0.5, σ = 0.2, x = 0.05, πH
I1 = 12, πL
I1 = 7, πH
I2 = 4, πL
I2 = 4, πH
E2 = 4,
πH
E2 = 1, KI = 50, and KE = 100.
26First, the relationship between values uI(·,·,H) and the duopoly proﬁt incumbent πH
I2





E ,H), and uI(xL
I ,xL
E,H). For πH
I2 ≥ 8.0, uI(xH
I ,xH
E,H) is greater than uI(xL
I ,xL
E,H).
As explained in Proposition 6.1, the high-demand incumbent does not deviate the optimal timing
of the investment truthfully, because the duopoly proﬁt of the incumbent is suﬃciently large and
the incumbent does not have a strong incentive to make the delay the investment of the entrant.
Hence, the high-demand incumbent enters the market at the optimal timing, and reveals his in-
formation truthfully. In contrast, for πH
I2 ≤ 2.9, uI(xH
I ,xH
E,H) is less than uI(xL
I ,xM
E ,H). In this
range, the high-demand incumbent invests at the optimal timing of the low demand to hide infor-
mation for high demand because the duopoly proﬁt of the incumbent is small and the decrement








E,H), the incumbent uses a mixed strategy as λ−
Hybrid Revelation. In this interval, the value of the incumbent is the same as uI(xH
I ,xH
E,H)









I2 ≤ 2.9 and is uI(xL
I ,xM
E ,H) for πH
I2 ≥ 2.9.
Figure 2 illustrates the probability λ that the high-demand incumbent invests at the optimal
timing for the high demand in the equilibrium strategy, i.e., the incumbent enters to the market
truthfully. For πH
I2 ≤ 2.9, Manipulative Revelation is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium so that
λ = 0, while for πH
I2 ≥ 8.0, Truthful Revelation is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium so that λ = 1.
For 2.9 < πH
I2 < 8.0, the incumbent uses a completely mixed strategy, and λ has a positive value,
which increases in πH
I2.
Next, the eﬀect of volatility is examined. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between the
values of the high-demand incumbent and the volatility. If the volatility is small, the incumbent
27invests truthfully, whereas if the volatility is large, the incumbent invests strategically. If the
volatility is moderate, the incumbent uses a mixed strategy.
The relationship between the investment cost and the value of the incumbent is then inves-
tigated. Figure 4 depicts the relationship between the values of the high-demand incumbent
and its cost of the investment. As explained in Proposition 6.2, the values decrease non-linearly
with investment cost and increase with proﬁt ﬂow. If the cost is small, Truthful Revelation
occurs, whereas if the cost is large, Manipulative Revelation occurs. If the cost is moderate, the
incumbent uses a complete mixed strategy, in which λ− Hybrid Revelation for some 0 < λ < 1
is an equilibrium.
Finally, the impact of the value of the incumbent on the investment cost of the entrant
is investigated. Note that the value of the incumbent is aﬀected not only by the own cost of
the incumbent, but also by the cost of the rival because the smaller cost of the entrant, which
pushes forward the investment of the entrant, reduces the value of the incumbent. Figure 5
depicts the relationship between the values of the high-demand incumbent and the cost of the
entrant. As shown shown in Proposition 6.2, if the cost of the entrant is large, then the timing
of the investment of the entrant is late. Since the eﬀect of the investment of the entrant on
the value of the incumbent is negligible, the high-demand incumbent invests truthfully. On the
other hand, the incumbent invests strategically for the case in which the cost of the entrant is
small. For a moderate interval of the cost of the entrant, the incumbent uses a mixed strategy.
8 Conclusion
The present paper examines an investment game for an incumbent and an entrant for optimal
entries into a new market in which only the incumbent has the information of whether the
demand, is high or low, and the entrant predicts the demand by observing the investment timing
28of the incumbent. Whether the incumbent reveals the information truthfully is investigated while
taking into account the signaling eﬀect by using the concept of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
A condition in which the incumbent with information of high demand invests strategically in
the equilibrium is characterized. A condition in which the incumbent to use a mixed strategy
in the equilibrium is also demonstrated.
If the duopoly proﬁt for the high-demand incumbent is small, then the incumbent invests
strategically, whereas the incumbent invests truthfully if the duopoly proﬁt is suﬃciently large.
The incumbent also invests strategically, if the volatility or the cost of the incumbent is large,
or if the cost of the entrant is small.
Since this is the ﬁrst study of signaling model for an investment game under real option
approach, extension of the model would be interesting in future research. Preemptive behavior
should be considered by eliminating the assumption in which the incumbent is the leader and the
entrant is the follower. Other stochastic processes could also be considered in order to extend
the model.
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29Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1: This proposition is derived by a standard calculation of the ﬁrst
hitting time (see for example Dixit and Pindyck (1994), pp. 315?316). Let ˆ t be the ﬁrst hitting






































First, we consider vI(xI,θ). If x > xI, then the incumbent immediately enters the market,





















If x ≤ xI, then tI is the ﬁrst hitting time of the stochastic process reaches a ﬁxed threshold















I1Xsds|X0 = x] − KIE[−e rtI|X0 = x].

































Proof of Proposition 3.1:
This proposition is derived by solving Eqs. (14) and (15) for πH
I2. In this proof, the condition
of Case (a) is shown to be obtainable by solving Eq. (14). The conditions of Case (b) and Case
(c) are obtained in a similar manner.
According to Eq. (4), the inequality (14) is expressed by
vI(xH
I ,H) − wI(xH
E,H) ≥ vI(xL
I ,H) − wI(xL
E,H),
which can be rewritten as
vI(xH
I ,H) − vI(xL
I ,H) ≥ wI(xH
E,H) − wI(xL
E,H). (22)
Then, Eq. (5) implies
vI(xH


























Substituting Eq. (8) into the above expression, we obtain
vI(xH
I ,H) − vI(xL
I ,H) = β (β − 1) 1xK
1 
I (r − µ) {(πH
I1) − ϕ(πL
I1)}, (23)




























31According to Eq. (1), xH
E and xL


























































which completes the proof.
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Figure 2: Probability of investment of the high-demand incumbent at the optimal timing for
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Figure 5: Values of the high-demand uI(·,·,H), high-cost KE incumbent
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